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This article lays the conceptual foundations for the 
study of the market value of information commodities. 
The terms “information” and “commodity” are given pre- 
cise definitions in order to characterize “information 
commodity,” and thus to provide a sound basis for ex- 
amining questions of pricing. Information is used by 
marketplace actors to make decisions or to control pro- 
cesses. Thus, we define information as the ability of a 
goal-seeking system to decide or control. By “decide” 
we mean choosing one alternative among several that 
may be executed in pursuit of a well-defined objective. 
“Control” means the ordering of actions. Two factors 
make it possible to turn something into a commodity: 
(1) appropriability, and (2) valuability. If something can- 
not be appropriated (i.e., owned), it cannot be traded; 
moreover, if it cannot be valued, there is no way to de- 
termine for what it might be exchanged. We define an 
information commodity as a commodity whose function 
it is to enable the user, a goal-seeking system, to obtain 
information, i.e., to otain the ability to decide or control. 
Books, databases, computer programs, and advisory 
services are common examples of information com- 
modities. Their market value derives from their capacity 
to furnish information. 
Introduction 
This is the first in a series of three articles on the 
market value of information, or more precisely, infor- 
mation commodities. The market for information com- 
modities, like other markets, may be analyzed in terms 
of supply and demand. Market prices reflect some sort 
of equilibrium (however imperfect) between these two 
forces. Our aim in this and the following articles (Mow- 
showitz, 1992a, b) is to elaborate methodologies for esti- 
mating lower and upper bounds on the market price for 
information commodities. By lower bound, we mean 
the lowest price (relative to a particular production 
method) the producer can charge without incurring 
losses; by upper bound, we mean the highest price (rela- 
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tive to a particular application) the consumer can pay 
without sacrificing profits. 
Determining lower bounds requires an analysis of 
the supply side or the producer’s perspective; estimat- 
ing upper bounds calls for analyzing the demand side or 
the user’s perspective. Note that we are concerned pri- 
marily with information commodities that have a 
derived demand. We do not attempt to determine the 
market value of information commodities produced for 
final consumption by consumers. Rather, the focus is 
on evaluating information commodities which are used 
to produce something else, either another information 
commodity or a conventional product or service. 
Before we can investigate price determination, a 
number of fundamental issues must be clarified. In par- 
ticular, we must explain what precisely we mean by “in- 
formation commodity.” To do this, we must first define 
the terms “information” and “commodity.” With ser- 
viceable definitions of these basic concepts, we will be 
in a position to characterize “information commodi- 
ties” and to study their pricing. 
The discussion of fundamental issues is essential for 
both the supply and demand perspectives, and thus it is 
presented as an independent article. 
Information 
Information has many faces. It appears as pure 
knowledge coveted by scholars, as skill acquired by 
children, as a requisite for individual or organizational 
decision making, as the stuff pumped through commu- 
nication or control channels, as the specification of a 
product or production process, etc. Whether dr not 
these manifold forms of information are different as- 
pects of a unity constitutes a fascinating and significant 
philosophical question. Fortunately, we do not have to 
resolve this question here. 
We are concerned with the economics of informa- 
tion.’ In particular, we want to know how certain kinds 
of information acquire value in the marketplace, and 
how that value is reflected in the equilibrium price for 
‘For an overview of information economics and extensive bibli- 
ographies, see Lamberton (1984a, b). 
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those kinds of information. This narrow focus excludes 
considerations of value other than those germane to ex- 
change relations in the marketplace. The value that a 
mathematician places on a solution to an open problem 
in mathematics is not primarily economic value. Nor is 
it economic value that a reader attributes to the mean- 
ing of a novel. Clearly, information is valued in many 
different ways. Thus we make explicit our restriction of 
the term “value of information” to the economics of the 
marketplace. 
Marketplace actors use information to make deci- 
sions and to control processes. The contexts of use are 
exchange, production, and consumption. Exchange and 
production use information as an instrumental or inter- 
mediate element; but information may also be the ob- 
ject of final consumption. 
Information is used by sellers in exchange transac- 
tions to determine the best price to charge for some item; 
it is used by buyers to determine the best price to pay. 
In production, information is used to make a variety 
of decisions about acquisition, allocation, use, and dis- 
tribution of resources. It is also used to control produc- 
tion processes and to specify the composition or 
production method of parts and processes. 
Information is an object of final consumption in 
many different contexts. For example, one pays to take 
courses in part because education enables one to qual- 
ify for a job; but some courses have only the most tenu- 
ous connection to career development. One sometimes 
reads instructional books for pleasure or personal 
growth. Some people even read financial magazines 
just out of (nonfinancial) interest in the stock market. 
These uses of information are no more intermediate 
than is the consumption of bread. If reading for per- 
sonal growth is seen as instrumental to one’s function- 
ing as, say an engineer, then so is the consumption 
of bread instrumental, for bread provides sustenance 
for the body supporting the job-related activities of 
the engineer. 
The difference between intermediate and final con- 
sumption of information is the same as the analogous 
distinction in the case of tangible economic goods. For 
intermediate goods it is possible to estimate both the 
vendor’s minimum asking price and the buyer’s maxi- 
mum offering price on the basis of exchange relations. 
On the other hand, an item destined for final consump- 
tion does not play a role in further production, so the 
buyer cannot determine the maximum, justifiable price 
on this basis. The vendor of an intermediate good must 
pass on the production costs to the buyer; the buyer of 
such a good can only justify a purchase if the use of the 
item purchased yields a return at least equal to the pur- 
chase price. The buyer of an item destined for final 
consumption has no intention of using it to produce 
something else to be offered for sale.’ 
?See King (1982) for discussion of information products and ser- 
vices marketed to end users. 
The pricing model we intend to introduce applies 
only to the production of information for sale, and the 
use of information as an intermediate economic good. 
However, the definition of information commodity, to- 
ward which we are aiming, applies to information in all 
its economic contexts. 
Many definitions of information have been pro- 
posed. The most prominent approach, linking informa- 
tion to probability distributions, was elaborated by 
Shannon (1949). This approach is distinguished by its 
introduction of a quantitative measure. Shannon’s cele- 
brated entropy measure, because of its extraordinary 
usefulness in communications engineering, has proven 
irresistable to observers in fields as divergent as biology 
and music.3 But it is generally agreed that Shannon’s 
measure, which equates information with uncertainty, 
is limited in its applicability.4 
In any event, it should be noted that a measure is not 
the same as a definition. A measure presupposes a defi- 
nition which specifies the domain of the measure’s ap- 
plicability. The definitions of information thus far 
proposed fail to specify the domain. We remedy this 
deficiency by viewing information as a property of cer- 
tain kinds of systems. 
Information is used by marketplace actors to make 
decisions or to control processes. This observation leads 
us to propose the following definition: Information is 
the ability of a goal-seeking system to decide or control.’ 
By “decide” we mean choosing one alternative among 
several that may be executed in pursuit of a well- 
defined objective. “Control” means the ordering of ac- 
tions that may be undertaken to achieve a well-defined 
objective. A goal-seeking system is one whose actions 
are designed to achieve a particular objective. Note 
that choosing and ordering are planning-related. Nei- 
ther implies the execution of planned actions. 
This definition implicitly distinguishes between 
choice and order, on the one hand, and the realization 
of choices and ordered sets of actions, on the other 
hand. Thus, a goal-seeking system may be able to exe- 
cute actions but, in the absence of information, will not 
be able to make choices or to control processes. A com- 
puter without a FORTRAN compiler, for example, has 
the capability of executing programs in general, but lacks 
the ability to translate a FORTRAN program into exe- 
3For further discussion of the many applications of Shannon’s 
information theory, see Mowshowitz (1987). 
4Hintikka (1984, p. 175) demonstrates this limitation by tracing 
the consequences of “clues. to the logical and mathematical be- 
havior of the concept of information.” Hoffman (1980, p. 293) pro- 
poses to overcome the limitation of the uncertainty measure by 
defining information as “an aggregate.. . of statements, of facts 
and/or figures which are conceptually, . . interrelated.” 
‘Compare this definition with the classical view. For example: 
(1) “Information. . . consists of events tending to change [individu- 
als’ subjective] probability distributions [over possible states of the 
world]” Hirshleifer, 1973). (2) “Intuitively, a change in information 
is a change in the probability distribution of states of the world” 
(Arrow, 1979). 
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cutable code because it does not have the ordered set of 
instructions that constitutes a FORTRAN compiler. 
Our definition of information as the ability to decide 
or control is consistent with Shannon’s interpretation of 
information as the removal of uncertainty. However, 
the economic value of H bits of information depends on 
the expected payoff associated with the use of those 
H bits. Two messages from different ensembles may 
have exactly the same entropy or uncertainty, but differ 
markedly in the respective payoffs expected from their 
use. Shannon’s entropy measure may be used to charac- 
terize the uncertainty removed by the receipt of a mes- 
sage in a decision-making context. But that measure 
tells us nothing about the economic value of a message 
to the recipient/decision maker.6 
The relationship between uncertainty and the eco- 
nomic value of information is analogous to the relation- 
ship between quantity and the economic value of 
tangible goods. Uncertainty or entropy measures the 
“amount of information” just as volume or weight mea- 
sures the “amount of tangible goods.” But information, 
like tangible goods, occurs in many different varieties. 
An ounce of butter does not have the same economic 
value as an ounce of gold. Similarly, the specification of 
a commercial baking process and grandmother’s recipe 
for apple pie are likely to diverge in economic value 
even if they happen to measure the same on the uncer- 
tainty scale. The world of information, like that of tan- 
gible goods, is highly differentiated and encompasses 
things of divergent economic value. 
The foregoing analysis agrees with Marschak (1959) 
on the relation between cost and amount (as measured 
by entropy or uncertainty) of information. Marschak 
(1959, p. 81) argues that “[amount of information] is not 
identical with the value of information.. . shown to de- 
termine the demand price. But it is presumably related 
to cost, and hence the supply price, of information.” 
Shannon’s entropy function was developed to measure 
the carrying capacity of information channels. Failure 
to realize that information is not an undifferentiated 
essence has led to many inappropriate adaptations of 
this measure outside the field of communications engi- 
neering. Entropy (as channel capacity) is useful for 
measuring the maximum amount of information (of any 
kind whatsoever) that can be pumped through a medium 
like a pair of copper wires; analogously, volume (as car- 
rying capacity) is useful for measuring the maximum 
amount of fluid (of whatever kind) that can be carried 
from port to port in a vessel such as a tanker. Measures 
of uncertainty and volume are extremely useful for car- 
riers of information and fluids, respectively; but they 
give virtually no clue as to the economic value to the 
user of what is being carried. 
The way in which information is priced in the mar- 
ketplace appears at first glance to be radically different 
6For further discussion of the relation between uncertainty and 
meaning see Langlois (1982) and Mowshowitz (1987). 
from the way energy is priced. Energy is priced accord- 
ing to quantity measures such as number of BTUs. A 
quantity of oil yielding a given number of BTUs will 
cost the same no matter what use is made of it. What 
about information? As we explained earlier, the eco- 
nomic value of information to a user cannot be deter- 
mined solely by the amount of uncertainty-reduction it
promises. What the comparison with energy reveals 
is that there are radical differences in the costs of 
producing different types of information with the same 
uncertainty-reduction value. The resulting variations in 
producer prices, coupled with variations in potential 
buyers’ willingness to pay, yields different rates for the 
same amount of information. 
Information, defined as “ability,” rather than 
“stuff,” has two complementary aspects: (1) the ability 
to observe or experiment, and (2) the ability to express 
beliefs.’ Consider the following observation about the 
water in a lake: “The current temperature of the water 
is c degrees Celsius.” Assuming temperature to be the 
only consideration, this observation would enable one 
to decide whether or not to go swimming. But the ob- 
servation (or fact) giving the current temperature is not 
the only element in the decision process. The ability 
to decide hinges upon a conditional statement and an 
inference rule, which are typically implicit in the deci- 
sion process. 
In our example, the conditional is of the form: “If 
the water temperature is between a and b degrees Cel- 
sius, then one can swim comfortably.” Now, assuming 
the value of c is between a and b, one could infer, by 
modus ponens, the statement “one can swim comfort- 
ably.” Note that the conditional statement together 
with the modus ponens inference rule would not, by 
themselves, be sufficient to make a decision about 
swimming. The condition expressed in the antecedent 
must be ascertained, i.e., the water temperature must 
be measured. To accomplish this, a measurement pro- 
cedure must be available. 
This example suggests interpreting information, i.e., 
the ability to decide or control, as a system consisting of 
two interacting components. The first of these might be 
called the belief subsystem; the second, the command 
subsystem. The belief subsystem encompasses declara- 
tive statements and inference rules; the command sub- 
system is composed of procedural statements together 
with rules for generating such statements.8 Note that 
the system characterized by these two components does 
not have any effector mechanisms. That is to say, it 
does not itself draw inferences or make observations. 
Such actions are performed by independent agents. 
‘The significance of this complementarity was brought to the 
author’s attention by Professor Giovanni Criscuolo. 
&rhe terms “declarative” and “procedural” are used here in a 
way that is entirely analogous to their use in the area of knowledge 
representation. See Winograd (1975) for a discussion of the rela- 
tionship between declarative and procedural forms of knowledge 
representation. 
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The information-ability to decide or control-rep- 
resented by the system sketched above lies in the rela- 
tionship between belief and command (or declaration 
and procedure). So-called facts, like the water tempera- 
ture in the example, confer the ability to decide when 
the relevant conditionals are in the belief system. Con- 
versely, statements of belief confer such ability when 
the requisite observation procedures are in the com- 
mand system. In short, the key to the ability that con- 
stitutes information lies in the complementarity of 
declarative and procedural statements. 
The declarative statements of the belief subsystem 
may be modeled as statements in predicate logic. These 
include descriptions of reality and arbitrary boolean 
combinations of descriptive statements. The state- 
ment about water temperature, discussed in the above 
example, illustrates a description of reality. Here are 
some more examples: 
(1) “The sky is overcast with dark clouds.” 
(2) “The temperature of the mixture in the blue con- 
tainer is 120 degrees Celsius.” 
(3) “John exceeded his sales quota this month.” 
(4) “Companies X, Y, and Z have all placed orders in 
excess of $1000 over the past quarter.” 
As explained earlier, statements uch as these, together 
with conditionals, facilitate decision making. Assuming 
one would prefer to avoid getting soaked in the rain, 
knowledge of current weather conditions as given in 
statement (1) enables one to decide whether or not to 
wear rain gear. Knowing the current temperature of a 
mixture as given in (2) allows one to decide whether or 
not to open a valve or to add another ingredient to the 
mixture. 
All of the above are examples of statements in 
propositional logic, i.e., they are either true or false. To 
accommodate the full range of descriptive statements, 
we need to go beyond propositional logic to predicate 
logic. We should like for example to admit statements 
of the form “Every product whose number begins with 
the string ‘acd2’ has been discontinued.” With this ex- 
tension to quantified statements, we have an adequate 
characterization of declarative statements. 
One further example may help to clarify the range of 
possibilities included in this characterization. Informa- 
tion obtained by searching a database typically consists 
of a set of items. Suppose such a set S consists of ele- 
ments a, b, c, d, and e which satisfy the criteria that 
defined the search. To represent the set as a proposi- 
tion, we first define the predicate A to mean “satisfying 
the search criteria.” Then the set S is the statement: 
A(a) A A(b) A A(c) A A(d) A A(e) 
Predicate logic suffices for declarative statements, 
but we need something more. Recipes, procedures, al- 
gorithms, and the like involve statements of the form 
‘Wdd two teaspoons of sugar.” or “Open the pressure 
valve if the sensor gives a reading above 20 psi.” or 
“Execute statement number 30 if x - y is less than 
zero.” These are all imperative statements, calling for 
action, and do not have a truth value. Thus, procedures, 
algorithms, process specifications, etc. comprise a vari- 
ety of statement hat is different from the declarative 
type. These are what we have been calling procedural 
statements. In the belief-command characterization of 
information as an ability, procedural statements pre- 
scribe how to obtain descriptions of reality. 
In summary, declarative statements express belief 
about the state of the world; procedural statements pre- 
scribe how to transform the world. The following recur- 
sive definitions summarize the foregoing discussion of 
these two types of statements. 
Declarative Statements (DS). 
(Ia) Any statement in first-order logic is DS. 
(IIa) If R and S are DS, then R * S is also DS, where 
* is any boolean operation. 
Procedural Statements (PS). 
(Ib) 
UIb) 
Any executable imperative statement is PS. 
(Executable means that the action or injunction 
of the imperative can be realized. Realizability is 
dependent on the universe of discourse. For ex- 
ample, the imperative “Go to Hell” would not 
be PS for an at heist .) 
If I and J are PS, then IJ and JI are PS, where 
XY signifies X followed by Y. 
An economically important attribute of statements 
(both declarative and procedural) is the extent to which 
they can be described by partial extracts or indexes. A 
statement’s extractability or indexability gives some in- 
sight into exchange possibilities in the marketplace. 
This follows from the fact that the less a statement can 
be indexed, the more the statement itself must be used 
to represent its usefulness to a potential purchaser. In 
the limiting case, usefulness cannot be ascertained 
without examining the item in its entirety; in other 
words, there is no way to index the statement apart 
from itself. 
Suppose, for example, a report saying “War has just 
broken out between countries A and B in region X” is 
issued by an exclusive and highly reliable source in that 
region. Suppose further that region X is isolated from 
the rest of the world and that the existence or nonexis- 
tence of a state of war between countries A and B has 
material implications for production or distribution of 
some commodity, say oil. From outside the region there 
is no way to estimate the value of the information with- 
out having it. That is to say, nothing short of knowing 
that a state of war exists will enable participants in the 
oil market to profit from the information contained in 
the report. 
A precise definition of indexability would be ex- 
tremely useful, but, like many useful things, it is not 
easy to obtain. Indeed, it may not be possible to pro- 
duce a definition that applies to all universes of dis- 
course. 
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Commodities 
Armed with a definition of “information” we need 
only clarify the meaning of “commodity” to arrive at a 
precise definition of “information commodity.” Econo- 
mists usually treat the term “commodity” as a primitive 
requiring no definition. Unfortunately, this approach 
fosters considerable ambiguity, since the word “com- 
modity” means different things to different users. Ab- 
sent help from the specialists, we resort to catalogues of 
common usage. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines commodity 
in the context of commerce as “a kind of thing pro- 
duced for use or sale, an article of commerce, an object 
of trade.” Other dictionaries give similar definitions: 
“an article of trade or commerce that can be trans- 
ported, especially an agricultural or mining product” 
(American Heritage Dictionary); “an economic 
good. . . a product of agriculture or mining.. . an article 
of commerce especially when delivered for shipment” 
(Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary). 
Except for the qualifying phrases “can be trans- 
ported” and “product of agriculture or mining” the 
wording used in these three definitions is the same. To 
get unanimity, one might argue that transportability is 
implicit in the OED’s phrase “produced for sale or use.” 
This would seem to exclude (naturally occurring) land 
and some other nontransportable things, and thus to be 
more or less in accord with the other definitions. The 
second qualifier-product of agriculture or mining- 
simply indicates the most commonly mentioned vari- 
eties of commodity. Intangible things such as patents, 
copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property 
seem to be excluded from consideration altogether. 
Unfortunately, the dictionary definitions fail to 
specify precisely what is meant by an article of trade. 
Business people often use the word commodity to refer 
to relatively high-volume products, as distinguished 
from specialized or one-of-a-kind articles. So, a special- 
ized machine built for a specific client would not be a 
commodity, whereas a standardized drill press would 
be. This distinction introduces replicability as an at- 
tribute of commodity. Since the specialized machine 
may very well be as transportable as the standardized 
one, replicability is not the same as transportability. 
Are these attributes essential to the notion of commod- 
ity? We think not. 
Two factors make it possible to turn things into ob- 
jects of trade: (1) appropriability, and (2) valuability. If 
something cannot be appropriated (i.e., owned), it can- 
not be traded; moreover, if it cannot be valued, there is 
no way to determine for what it might be exchanged. 
Appropriation and valuation are both social processes. 
The former implies a legal system that defines rights 
in property and the conditions under which property 
can be transferred; the latter implies collective knowl- 
edge of the uses of things in relation to human needs 
and wants. 
A simple mathematical representation may help to 
clarify this interpretation of a commodity. Let G be a 
set of economic goods, where the notion of economic 
goods (e.g., land, natural resources, farm products, 
manufactured goods, labor, intellectual property, finan- 
cial instruments, etc.) is a primitive in the model; and 
let 0 be a set of ownership units. Note that the ele- 
ments of 0 depend on the legal system. In modern 
America, individuals, partnerships, corporations, joint- 
tenants, tenants-in-common, and perhaps other entities 
would qualify as ownership units. 
Now we define appropriability as a function A map- 
ping G into 0 as follows: 
A(g) = u, if u owns g undefined otherwise 
The inclusion of various types of owning units in 0 
allows us to handle the case of shared ownership. If, 
for example, several individuals own something jointly 
as shareholders or partners, the owning unit of which 
they are members would be an element of the set 0. 
Thus, if an economic good in G is assigned an owner in 
0, that owner is unique. 
Valuation may be defined as a function mapping 
equivalence classes of economic goods into the real 
numbers. An equivalence class of economic goods is a 
set of individual items or tokens of a given type (e.g., 
all toasters with model number 783425 produced by 
United Widgets, Inc.). Two tokens of the same type are 
“essentially the same,” meaning that neither producer 
nor user would be able to distinguish one from another. 
The precise meaning of this indistinguishability varies 
from one market context to another. For example, un- 
like discrete products such as toasters and automobiles, 
bulk goods like wheat and petroleum are typically 
traded in multiples of volume units determined by their 
respective markets. So, equivalence for wheat would 
mean the interchangeability of two bushels of the same 
type, grade, etc. 
Whereas ownership involves tokens, valuation ap- 
plies to equivalence classes of tokens. The valuation 
function V maps the equivalence classes of G into R, 
the set of real numbers: 
I 
c, if c is the nonzero average 
Vkl) = price paid for any token in [g] 
undefined otherwise 
Since the market prices of tokens belonging to the same 
type may vary, we choose the average in order to assign 
a unique number to a given type. The entire set of reals 
(rather than the nonnegative reals) is used in the defini- 
tion, because some equivalence classes of economic 
goods (such as toxic byproducts of industrial processes) 
may have negative values. Since some byproducts are 
owned and incur costs in disposal, they must be treated 
as equivalence classes with negative value. 
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Having specified the meanings of ownership and 
valuation, we are in a position to define commodity. 
A commodity is an equivalence class [g] of economic 
goods such that V([g]) = c (nonzero real number) and 
A(x) = u for everyx in [g]. The two conditions specify, 
respectively, that [g] has a unique value, and every 
member of [g] has a unique owner. Note that [g] could 
consist of a single element, i.e., [g] = {e}, so we allow 
unique goods such as artistic works within our defini- 
tion of commodity. If a work of art has an owner and a 
market value, it is a commodity. 
This definition of commodity introduces two sets, G 
and 0, and two functions, A and V. Both the sets and 
the functions may vary over time-economic goods and 
owners have finite life spans; ownership is transferrable 
and prices vary with changes in the marketplace. Thus, 
we may indicate the dependence of G, 0, A, V on time 
by the use of a subscript  representing time. The values 
assumed by t will depend on the context. When the 
time period is specified and fixed by context, we can 
safely omit the subscripts. 
Money plays a special role in this scheme. We as- 
sume that all economic goods involved in exchange 
could be exchanged for money. So, if some of the mem- 
bers of an equivalence class [g] are exchanged for goods, 
we can assign a monetary value to the barter transac- 
tion and use it in computing the average for the class. 
As a standard of value, money- albeit time-varying- 
serves as a unit of measurement. Although not a perfect 
analogue of, say, the meter as a unit of length, money 
does function as a measure of market value. Note that a 
particular meter stick bears the same relationship to 
the meter (as a unit of length) as a particular dollar bill 
to the dollar (as a unit of exchange value). For example, 
the meter is infinitely divisible, but a meter stick is not. 
The same holds for the dollar in relation to the dollar 
bill. These two abstract units differ in that the meter is 
based on a constant feature of the physical universe, 
whereas the dollar (or other monetary unit) is based on 
properties of a social universe that is known to vary 
over time .9 
Our formal definition of commodity is somewhat 
broader than the notions used intuitively by some 
economists and businesspeople. However, it reflects the 
actual state of affairs more accurately than these in- 
tuitive notions. In an advanced market economy, any- 
thing that can be appropriated and assigned a market 
value may be a commodity. 
This observation is crucial for analyzing so-called in- 
formation commodities because these kinds of com- 
modities appear at first glance to be fundamentally 
“The analogy between money and length applies only to their 
respective measurement properties. Money, unlike length, func- 
tions as a store of value and medium of exchange. It makes little 
sense to speak of storing length (as, for example, a collection of 
yard sticks), or to exchange a “store of length” for something else. 
different from what we normally conceive to be com- 
modities. With our definition, the differences dissolve. 
Information Commodities 
If information-whatever it may be-can be owned 
and valued, it can be a commodity. This gives us pre- 
cise criteria for determining the commodity-hood of in- 
formation. Can a piece of software be owned and 
priced? Appropriability and valuability are the key is- 
sues here, not the intangible character of an idea re- 
flected in an algorithm or a computer program. 
If property rights in a class of programs can be pro- 
tected effectively, and if the programs can be exchanged 
for a nonzero amount of money or for commodities of 
nonzero value, then the class of programs may consti- 
tute a commodity. This line of reasoning leads one to 
ask two fundamental questions: (1) what precisely is to 
be protected, and (2) how does software or any other 
putative information commodity acquire market value? 
Let us consider first what is needed to protect prop- 
erty rights in an arbitrary commodity. Then we will ana- 
lyze the special case of property rights in information 
commodities. 
According to our definition, each token of a com- 
modity must have a unique owner. This implies means 
for keeping track of who owns what, and social mecha- 
nisms for protecting the interests of owners. Clearly, 
the idea of ownership is meaningless in the absence of 
a system of enforceable laws that defines property, and 
establishes procedures for determining and transferring 
ownership and settling disputes among claimants to 
property. 
Protection of tangible or concrete commodities poses 
no major conceptual difficulty in the world of today. 
This is because tangible commodities like loaves of 
bread, cars, television sets, bushels of wheat, etc. are 
discrete physical objects whose use by one owner pre- 
cludes use by any other owner. Once a loaf of bread has 
been consumed, it exists no more. The simplest form of 
ownership is socially sanctioned physical possession. 
Protection of ownership in this case requires reliable 
means for identifying owners, e.g., testimony of neigh- 
bors or officials, and insuring their ability to retain 
physical possession of their goods. 
If tangible commodities can be held for their owners 
by third parties, identification of owners becomes more 
complicated. In this case, formal inventories must be 
maintained, and the inventories themselves protected 
against tampering. Thus, property rights in tangible 
commodities can be protected by a social system with: 
(1) reliable and secure inventories of ownership, and (2) 
effective means for securing persons and premises 
against theft of tangible goods. 
Abstract commodities share with their concrete 
counterparts the need for reliable inventory systems. 
Moreover, they must also be protected against theft. 
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But theft may not involve unauthorized physical re- 
moval of property in the case of abstract commodities. 
Some abstract commodities (e.g., a financial instrument 
such as a bearer bond) have the same property charac- 
teristics as their concrete cousins (e.g., a television set). 
Ownership of bearer bonds requires essentially the 
same methods of protection as ownership of a televi- 
sion set. The differences between these two commodi- 
ties have to do with the way they are used, not with 
protection of the property rights of their respective 
owners. 
Nonnegotiable securities give greater importance to 
the third-party surrogate for the owner. The key to 
ownership in these cases is the record of ownership, a 
table showing the correspondence between a collection 
S of securities and a set of owners. (In terms of the 
notation introduced earlier, this record is just the re- 
striction of the function A to the set S.) Protection of 
property rights in this kind of commodity is tanta- 
mount to maintaining the security and integrity of the 
record system. 
Thus far we have been speaking of conventional 
commodities, whether concrete (e.g., a loaf of bread) or 
abstract (e.g., registered securities). Are information 
commodities fundamentally different from the conven- 
tional ones? Certainly, information is different from 
energy and matter; but this does not necessarily imply 
that a commodity somehow made up of information in- 
herits those differences. 
Bread and information differ with respect to the re- 
sults of consumption.“’ When a loaf of bread is eaten, 
its essence is gone; but information is preserved under 
consumption: a book can be read and reread, a program 
executed repeatedly, a database queried by many users, 
etc., with no degradation of the information contained 
in book, program, or database. What this suggests is 
that a given piece of information cannot be appropri- 
ated for exchange in the marketplace, because both 
seller and buyer have it after the former conveys it to 
the latter. 
Nevertheless, books, computer programs, and data- 
bases are traded in the marketplace. Are these things 
economic anomalies? A new order of commodities? Not 
at all. The apparent contradiction disappears when one 
realizes that an information commodity is not the same 
thing as a piece of information. These commodi- 
ties “contain” information in some sense, but they are 
commodities just like bread, television sets, and com- 
mon stocks. 
As argued above, anything that is appropriable and 
has market value may be turned into a commodity. 
Thus, information could be turned into a commodity if 
it is possible to incorporate it in something that can be 
appropriated and valued in the marketplace. In fact 
‘“See Boulding (1966), Hall (1981), Braunstein (1981), and Cleve- 
land (1982) for further discussion of the special economic charac- 
teristics of information. 
business people have been doing just that with informa- 
tion for some considerable time. The market value of 
an information commodity derives from its capacity to 
support decision or control processes by furnishing in- 
formation; but this capacity is only partly dependent on 
the specific information (ability to decide or control) 
furnished by the commodity. 
An example, which purports to show how informa- 
tion functions in the marketplace, may help to clarify 
this distinction. Commodities traders are eager con- 
sumers of information released by the United States 
Department of Agriculture on the American wheat 
crop. Unexpected changes in estimated crop yields in- 
fluence the price of wheat futures contracts-increases, 
unanticipated by market participants, tend to drive 
prices down, while decreases push them up. By selling 
short on reports of unexpected crop increases or buying 
long on reports of decreases, it is possible for traders to 
make handsome profits. Of course, to profit from such 
information, the trader would have to obtain and act on 
the reports before they become general knowledge, i.e., 
to trade on “inside information.” 
If it were possible to purchase the information (i.e., 
the ability to make the investment decision) in advance 
of the public announcement, how much should the 
trader be willing to pay for it? At first glance it seems 
reasonable to calculate its value in terms of the profit 
that could potentially be realized from acting on it as 
inside information. But how could this calculation be 
made in advance of having the information?” There is 
no way to know whether to trade short or long, and no 
way to estimate the potential gains without having the 
information itself. So the trader cannot decide what to 
pay before having it; but if the seller were to allow the 
trader to see the report before being paid for the infor- 
mation, the seller might have a hard time collecting 
anything, regardless of the profit made by the trader. 
Assuming the trader is convinced that he or she will 
never again have occasion to purchase information 
from the informant, he or she may very well withhold 
payment on the grounds that nothing was actually 
taken from the informant. 
As explained earlier, the information associated 
with a declarative statement hat has no index other 
than itself has no exchange value.12 That is to say, an 
item whose usefulness cannot be assessed before being 
extracted in a way which precludes an exchange be- 
tween a buyer and a seller is not a commodity. So, the 
unextractable information described in the example 
cannot be made into a commodity. The key to inter- 
preting the example lies in the condition under which 
“As Braunstein (1981, p. 11) puts it: “I cannot be certain of the 
value to me of a bit of information until I know what it is.” 
r*Braunstein (1981, p. ll), elaborating on the remark cited ear- 
lier, observes: “In fact, I cannot make an accurate judgment on the 
basis of part of the information or on information about the infor- 
mation. And if I did have perfect information about what was 
being offered for sale, I would no longer need to purchase it.” 
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the trader is likely to withhold payment, i.e., when he 
has no intention of using the informant again. To deter- 
mine in advance how much it is worth paying the infor- 
mant, the trader must have reasonable expectations of 
gains to be made from information made available by 
this particular informant or by comparable ones under 
similar circumstances. That is to say, one must know 
enough to estimate the informant’s ability to deliver in- 
formation that will enable the trader to decide what 
commodity investments to make. 
Thus we are led to define an information commodity 
as a commodity whose function it is to enable the user, 
a goal-seeking system, to obtain information, i.e., to 
obtain the ability to decide or control. Books, data- 
bases, computer programs, and advisory services are 
common examples of information commodities. Their 
market value derives from their capacity to furnish in- 
formation.13 Thus, we will examine the specific contri- 
butions of various attributes of information commodities 
to their capacity to inform, and hence their respective 
contributions to market value. 
The definition of information commodity given here 
is designed to permit systematic analysis of the elements 
that give such commodities value in the marketplace. 
Every information commodity has a kernel of informa- 
tion, which is the particular “ability to decide or con- 
trol” sought by a potential user. However, that kernel 
must be carried by an agent, whether a human being or 
an artifact, and must be accessible to a potential user in 
appropriate form to be of value-l4 Information-other 
than the kernel-may again come into play here, but so 
do other ingredients. These we will explain in the se- 
quel (Mowshowitz, 1991a) to this article. 
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